Bear River Mutual Insurance Company v. Robert Wright, Mike Martinez : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1988
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company v. Robert
Wright, Mike Martinez : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Thomas A. Duffin; Spafford, Dibb, Duffin and Jensen; attorneys for repsondent.
Robert J. Debry, G. Steven Sullivan; attorneys for appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Bear River Mutual v. Wright, No. 880249.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2210




K F U 
50 
DOCKET N O ^ a f f t ^ C A 
IN THE SUPREME COUftT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE ] 
COMPANY, ] 
Respondent, 
ROBERT WRIGHT AND MIKE ] 
MARTINEZ, ; 
Appellant. ] 
Cas^ No. 8605-79 
| 88-0249-
i Category No, 14b 
•01 









DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
700 East, Suite 500 
ke City, Utah 84107 
(801) 262-8915 
Thomas Duffin 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, DIBB & JACKSON 
3J1 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
FILED 
SEP 2 51987 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE ] 
COMPANY, ] 
Respondent, ] 
ROBERT WRIGHT AND MIKE ] 
MARTINEZ, ] 
Appellant. 
> Case No. 8605-79 
i Category No. 14b 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
I 
G. STEVEN SULLIVAN 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
Thomas Duff in 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, DIBB & JACKSON 
3J1 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
TABLE OF CONTENT$ 
POINT I 1 
THIS CASE INVOLVES A QUESTION OF LAW. 
THIS COURT IS NOT BOUND BY THE LEGAL 
CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT. . 1 
POINT II 1 
ROBERT WRIGHT PAID FOR AND DESERVED 
COMPENSATION UNDER HIS POLICY WITH 
BEAR RIVER 1 
POINT III < 2 
THE UTAH UNINSURED MOTORIST STATUTE IS 
REMEDIAL IN NATURE. IT SHOULD BE LIBERALLY 
CONSTRUED TOWARD MEETING THE INTENT OF THE 
LEGISLATURE
 h 2 
POINT IV 5 
THE BASIS FOR THE EXCLUSION IS WITHOUT 
SUBSTANCE 5 
POINT V 6 
THE UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE SHOULD 
NOT BE REDUCED BY EARLIER PAID BENEFITS 6 
CONCLUSION 9 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
PAGE 
Barnett v. Crosby, 
612 P.2d 1250 (Kansas 1980) 4 
Bradley v. Mid-Century Ins., 
294 N.W.2d 141 (Mich 1980) 7 
Brown v. United Service Automobile Association, 
684 P.2d 1195 (Okla. 1984) , 3 
Calvert v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona, 
697 P.2d 684 (Ariz. 1985) , 6 
Clayton v. Alliance Mutual Casualty Co., 
212 Kan. 640, Syl. 1, 512 P.2d ^07 (1973) 4 
Coates v. American Economy Ins. Co., 
627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981) j 3 
Elledge v. Warren, 
263 So.2d 912 (La.Ct.App. 1972). 5 
Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call, 
712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985) , 3 
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. y. 
Dairyland Ins. Co., 
545 P. 2d 113 (Oregon 1975) < 3 
Jacobson v. Implement Dealers Ins., 
640 P.2d 908 (Mont. 1982) 5 
Kau v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co./ 
564 P.2d 443 (Hawaii 1977) 3 
Newton v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 
594 P.2d 1042 (Colo. 1979) 8 
North River Ins. Co. v. Kowaleski, 
551 P.2d"l286 (Or. 1976) , 2 
Nygaurd v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 
221 N.W.2d 151 (Minn 1974) |. 6 
Ulwell v. Clark, 
658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982) 1 
ii 
Provo City Corp. v, Nieisuu Scot Company, Inc., 
603 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979) " ••••. 1 
Simpson v. F a r m e r s j n s # Co., 
592 P. 2d 445 (Kansas 1979 )
 0 e e • . 
State Farm Mututal Auto Ins. Co^_y±_Hinkel, 
488 P.2d 1151 (Nev. 1971)........... . 
Thamert v. Continental Casualty__Cg_. , 
621 P.2d 702 (Utah 1980)....*. . ...• . 3 
Van Hoozer v. Farmers Insurance Exchange; 
219 Kan. 595f 607f 549 P.2d 1354 (1976), 4 
L -.ul. v^. _-.y i um.1. £JL_ a tied: 
§ 4 1 -1;- -: i j . *<- p-.'-r • • ........... 2 
§ ; l -J • • - *a . an a m e n d e d j 97 ^ u 
'.. mended ' * - . , . . , , 
§4 3 -1 - - amendec , . , « 
Other Authorities: 
POINT I 
THIS CASE INVOLVES A QUESTION OF LAW, 
THIS COURT IS NOT BOUND BY THE LEGAL 
CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT 
The facts f the case are not contradicted Where 
the isbUH - , una COUI t --ows '"> deference to the 
conclusion of - -rr^l nourt. 01 we 11 .
 :sj ?d 
ri ft ri | IJ t a I 'w ' Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scot Company, 
Inc« , 603 ; * * •" * s case, a de 
novo review cf trie issues is appropriate. 
POINT 11 
ROBERT WRIGHT PAID FOR AND DESERVED 
COMPENSATION UNBER HIS POLICY WITH BEAR RIVER 
i" "t""1" i Wright (hereafter "Wrigbr vi> " 
tempting to -^\ o^iiiething for nothing in - , * 
had paid for uninsured motorist benefits Those benefits 
covered Wrighi 111 11 i >-,. ant omot i i 1 H 





 *"••  tranue on it. Bear Rivler argues that Wright 
assume*; * n%- t ,?v Howeverf during oral argument, 'hi:- |>J < t 
of the Wright deposition w^s discusser. Beat: River acknowl-
edge. '• i • •- • -m. '"'insurance" generally 
and "uninsured motorist protection 
The L'jur;' : Mt . *-u 1 1 \ *^ n is correct, you 
weren't talking <a:< n* linsured motorist 
coverage, you wen1 ta Iking about 
•1 
insurance coverage. To the extent there 
is a difference, you acknowledge that? 
Mr. Duffin: Yes. 
(P.15, hearing transcript attached hereto as Appendix "A".) 
Wright does not contend the liability portion of 
the auto policy extends to the bike. The liability policy 
is very different from the uninsured policy. The two are 
different in statutory requirements, intent and risk expo-
sure. Wright had paid for uninsured motorist insurance at 
the time of this accident. This protection covered Wright -
not his property. Wright is not asking for any coverage he 
has not paid for. 
POINT III 
THE UTAH UNINSURED MOTORIST STATUTE IS REMEDIAL 
IN NATURE. IT SHOULD BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED 
TOWARD MEETING THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE 
The intent of the uninsured motorist statute is 
clear. That is to put the injured policy holder in the same 
position he would be in if the tort-feasor had liability 
insurance. North River Ins. Co. v. Kowaleski, 551 P.2d 1286 
(Or. 1976). This intent is obvious from reading the statute 
itself. 
for the protection of persons 
insured thereunder who are legally 
entitled to recover damages from owners 
or operators of uninsured motor vehicles 
and hit-and-run motor vehicles because 
of bodily injury, sickness or disease, 
including death resulting therefrom. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Section 41-12-21.1, U.C.A., as amended, 1983. 
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Insurance companies have routinely attempted to 
narrow the coverage required by uninsured motorist statutes. 
Courts have just as routinely invalidated such exclusions. 
See Coates v. American Economy Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 92 (Utah 
1981); Thamert v. Continental Casualty Co./ 621 P.2d 702 
(Utah 1980); and Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 
(Utah 1985). 
In Brown v. United Service Automobile Association/ 
684 P.2d 1195 (Okla. 1984) the insured was injured by a 
hit-and-run driver. The innocent owner of the guilty 
vehicle was later identified. The driver of the guilty 
vehicle was not. The subject policy included a definition 
of hit-and-run driver not found in the statute. This 
definition would deny coverage under the facts. The court 
invalidated the restrictive definition/ finding: 
. . . provisions and definitions which 
purport to condition, limit or dilute 
the provisions of the uninsured motorist 
statute are void and unenforceable. 
(Citations omitted.) 
See also Kau v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. 
Co., 564 P.2d 443 (Hawaii 1977) exclusion limiting uninsured 
motorist protection to injuries sustained while occupying 
owned motor vehicle held void; Simpson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 
592 P. 2d 445 (Kansas 1979) exclusion limiting uninsured 
motorist coverage to hit-and-run accidents involving "con-
tact" held void; Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. 
Dairyland Ins. Co., 545 P.2d 113 (Oregon 1975) exclusion 
limiting uninsured motorist coverage to accidents where 
vehicle occupied by insured is drivern by person in excess 
of 25 years held void. 
In Barnett v. Crosby, 612 P.2d 1250 (Kansas 1980) 
(attached as Appendix "B"), the court was faced with the 
identical exclusion as in the subject case. There, the 
insured had affirmatively rejected uninsured motorist 
protection on his motorcycle. Reviewing the Kansas unin-
sured motorist statute, the court said: 
The offer of uninsured motorist coverage 
to policyholders is mandatory under 
40-284. Furthermore, any provisions of 
the insurance policy which purport to 
condition, limit or dilute the unquali-
fied uninsured motorist coverage mandat-
ed by the statute are void and unen-
forceable. Van Hoozer v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, 219 Kan. 595, 607, 
549 P.2d 1354 (1976); Clayton v. Alli-
ance Mutual Casualty Co., 212 Kan. 640, 
Syl. 1, 512 Pj2d 507 (1973) . 
• * * * 
Therefore, since the mandatory uninsured 
motorist statute (K.S.A. 40-284) re-
quires protection of the insured wherev-
er he may be (Midwest Mututal), it is 
apparent that the AID exclusion clause 
is an attempt to dilute this mandated 
coverage and consequently is void. 
The fact that Barnett rejected the 
extension of uninsured motorist coverage 
in his motorcycle policy with Midwest 
Mutual Insurance Company does not change 
the liability of AID under its uninsured 
motorist provision. Barnett paid an 
additional premium to insure himself 
against the eventuality of colliding 
with an uninsured motorist and should 
receive the benefits for which he paid. 
A clear majoirty of courts having dealt with this 
issue have voided the subject exclusion. 
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Like Kansas, the Utah uninsured motorist statute 
follows the person, not the insured vehicle. The Utah law 
requires coverage whenever the insured is hurt at the hands 
of an uninsured driver. Exclusions otherwise limiting this 
coverage are invalid. See also 20 A.L.R.4d 1069. 
Since the Utah statute is remedial in nature, it 
should be construed broadly toward affording coverage. 
Simpson v. Farmers Insurance Co., 592 p.2d 445 (Kan. 1979). 
POINT IV 
THE BASIS FOR THE EXCLUSION 
IS WITHOUT SUBSTANCE 
Bear River has repeatedly argued that Wright would 
be "cheating" the insurance company if the exclusion is 
voided. Bear River's argument is founded in the rationale 
that uninsured motorist coverage extends to the insured 
vehicle instead of the insured persoft. That rationale is 
patently incorrect. The express wording of the law provides 
coverage to the person, not the vehicle. The intent of the 
law is to put the injured insured in the position he would 
be in if the tort-feasor had liability coverage. 
Since uninsured motorist coverage follows the 
person, not the vehicle, the exclusion has no significant 
connection to the risk involved. Ttie majority of courts 
that have examined this "Business Interest" argument have 
rejected it. Elledqe v. Warren, 263 So.2d 912 (La.Ct.App. 
1972); Jacobson v. Implement Dealers Ins.f 640 P.2d 908 
5 
(Mont. 1982); State Farm Mututal Auto Ins. Co. v. Hinkel, 
488 P.2d 1151 (Nev. 1971); Nyqaurd v. State Farm Mutual Ins. 
Co./ 221 N.W.2d 151 (Minn 1974); and Calvert v. Farmers Ins. 
Co. of Arizona, 697 P.2d 684 (Ariz. 1985). 
There is no difference between this exclusion and 
one voiding coverage while the insured is in a non-owned 
automobile. Logically, the insured has paid no premium on 
either vehicle. Thus, the insured would be "cheating" the 
insurance carrier in either instance. In fact, the logic 
behind the subject exclusion could easily be extended to 
limit uninsured motorist coverage to the insured automobile 
only, that is clearly not the intent of the legislature. 
If the Legislature chooses to limit the Utah 
statute it may do so. The Legislature had included such an 
exclusion within the Utah no-fault law at the time of this 
accident. See §31-41-10(a)(i), Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended 1973. The absence of this specific exclusion within 
the uninsured statute evidences a clear intent by the 
legislature to afford coverage under these facts. 
POINT V 
THE UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE SHOULD NOT 
BE REDUCED BY EARLIER PAID BENEFITS 
Bear River's policy includes a provision for the 
reduction of uninsured motorist benefits. This provision 
reduces benefits for all sums otherwise paid by or on behalf 
of the owner or operator of the vehicle. (See Part IV -
6 
Limits of Liability" of said policy as attached to Bear 
River's brief.) 
The Utah no-fault law provides for set-off to 
no-fault benefits. (See §31-41-7, Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended 1973.) 
The Utah Uninsured Motorist statute does not allow 
for any reduction of benefits. (See 41-12-21.1, Utah Code 
Annotated, as amended 1967.) If the legislature intended 
uninsured motorist benefits to be reduced by other benefits 
paid out, appropriate language would bp included within the 
law. 
Bear River's set-off provision is yet another 
attempt to reduce the minimum coverage called for by Utah 
law. This Court has already held such reductions inappro-
priate. Thamert v. Continental Casualty Co., 621 P.2d 702 
(Utah 1980). 
The rationale of Thamert was that such a reduction 
was not authorized by statute. Such a reduction would 
result in benefits below the minimum coverage called for by 
Utah law. This explanation is forceful in effect. If 
reduction of benefits is allowed, uninsured motorist cover-
age will be erased in many instances. 
The court in Bradley v. Mid-Century Ins., 294 
N.W.2d 141 (Mich 1980) said: 
Unless voluntarily purchased uninsured 
motorist coverage provides meaningful 
protection for severe, above-threshold, 
injuries without regard tfo what the 
insurer is required to pay under the 
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mandatory no-fault coverage, it serves 
no apparent purpose in the context of a 
no-fault statute mandating the payment 
of benefits. If the set-off were 
enforced in the manner the insurers 
seek, no-fault benefits paid would 
reduce uninsured motorist coverage 
dollar for dollar. As soon as the 
insurer has paid out $20,000 in no-fault 
benefits, there would be no recovery 
whatsoever under the uninsured motorist 
endorsement. The insured could be 
entitled to collect substantial non-eco-
nomic damages from the uninsured motor-
ist but would, by reason of the set-off 
receive nothing from the insurer. 
If the set-off of no-fault benefits 
were to be enforced in the manner the 
insurers seek, it would mean that the 
uninsured motorist, endorsement, de-
signed to secure recovery from an 
uninsured motorist, would provide no 
recovery in those cases where the 
injuries are most severe because the 
severity of the injuries maximized the 
no-fault benefits for work loss or 
medical expenses. 
See also Newton v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. 
Co. , 594 P.2d 1042 (Colo, 1979); Van Hoozer v. Farmers Ins. 
Exchange, 549 P.2d 1354 (Kan, 1976); 
Bear River's argument concerning the set-off 
provision is similar to that voiced by Justice Hall in his 
dissenting opinion in the Thamert opinion. Wright respect-
fully disagrees with Justice Hall's position in that case. 
The language of the uninsured motorist statute is plain, 
unambiguous and mandatory in effect. If Wright chooses to 
purchase the uninsured motorist coverage, that policy must 
meet the minimum coverage called for by Utah law. The 
subject "reduction" clause gives Bear River the premium 
dollar of Wright without affording the protection called for 
8 
by Utah law. The carrier collects separate premiums for 
uninsured motorist coverage and no-fault coverage. The 
carrier might then erase the uninsured motorist coverage 
through the set-off provision of the policy. The result, 
the insured is left uncompensated for all non-economic 
damages suffered and often for certain economic injury not 
paid by the no-fault coverage. 
The rationale of Thamert Should be upheld and 
applied in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Safety Responsibility Act was created to 
set forth the minimum motor vehicle insurance coverage that 
might be sold in this state. Insurance companies have, and 
will continue, to come up with exclusionary language which 
cuts into the basic insurance coverage required by Utah law. 
The exclusion voiding uninsured motorist coverage 
for an owned uninsured automobile must be held to violate 
the statute and public policy. So too should the policy 
clause calling for reduction of benefits otherwise paid to 
the injured party. 
J; ^ Respectfully submitted this A day of 
/' RhW , 1987 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for AppeVlarM: 
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Cikil No. C85-7999 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
September 22, 1986 
BE IT REMEMBERED that the above-entitled cause 
came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Timothy 
R. Hanson, a Judge oF the Third Judicial District Court of 
the State of Utah, at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah on the 22nd day of September, 1986, at 
2:30 p.m., and that the following proceedings were had. 
* * * 
Bunny Neuenschwander, CSR, RPR, CP 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff: Thomas A. Duffin 
SPAFFORD, DIBB, DUFFIN & 
JENSEN 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
For the Defendant Wright: G. Steven Sullivan 
ROBERT J. DeBRY & ASSOCIATES 
965 East 4800 South 
Suite No. 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
* * * 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
September 22, 1986 
2:30 p.,m. 
THE COURT; We are in session in the matter of 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company versus Robert J. Wright 
and Mark Martinez, Civil No. C85-79$9. There are 
reciprocal motions for summary judgment before the Court. 
And there has been a motion to publish the deposition of 
Robert J. Wright that was filed with this Court. I assume 
there is no objection. 
MR. SULLIVAN: No objection. 
THE COURT: Gentlemen, will you make your 
appearances, for the record? 
MR. SULLIVAN: Steven Sullivan for the Defendant 
Robert Wright. 
MR. DUFFIN: Thomas A. Duf^in for the Plaintiff 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company!. 
MR. SULLIVAN: There are three, Your Honor, issues 
involved in today's argument. Those consist of whether or 
not the subject exclusion works to excuse the uninsured 
motorist coverage applicable under the facts. The second 
issue, if there is coverage whether^ or not the setoff 
limitation would apply to limit the uninsured motorist 
coverage. And the third issue is whether or not the 
arbitration clause of the contract binds the parties to 
3 
such arbitration. 
Looking first to the coverage issue, Your Honor, 
that issue has been quite well briefed by both parties. It 
really boils down to two simple arguments. First is 
whether or not the Utah statutes allows for limitations, or 
exclusions to otherwise limit the minimum coverage set out 
in that statute. Your Honor, the uninsured motorist 
statute is found at Section 41-12-21.1. And it's quite 
broadly worded. There are really only two requirements for 
coverage here. First is that an insured person is injured, 
suffers sickness or disease at the hands of an uninsured 
motorist. And that's it. That's the amount of the 
statute. 
Like I say, it's very broadly worded. And we 
think it's worded in such a way for a purpose. And that 
is, it's simply designed to take the place of liability 
coverage on the part of the uninsured driver. Therefore, 
any injuries suffered by the insured which would be covered 
by that uninsured driver would be covered under this 
uninsured coverage statute. 
As discussed in the memorandum, Your Honor, there 
have been several attempts by other insurance companies to 
place limitations and exclusions on the uninsured motorist 
coverage. For instance, Farmers Exchange versus Call. In 
that case, it involves an exclusion based on the household, 
or members of the household exclusion to limit liability 
coverage. The Utah court rejected that limitation, and in 
fact indicated that the statute holds no exclusions to the 
minimum coverage. Therefore, there pan be no exclusion. 
Very broad indication that the Court does not want to limit 
the minimum coverage set out in these statutes. 
Also, there is the case of |Fhambert versus 
Continental Casualty Company. That earned a setoff 
limitation under the Workman's Compensation. And again, 
the Utah Court said there was no such exclusion in the 
statute. Therefore, we are not goinig to hold that 
limitation as active. If the Court does find that 
limitations, or exclusions may be rqad in Utah, we believe 
the present exclusion is inappropriate. 
The Plaintiff has argued that the number of motor 
vehicles owned by the insured is thq basis for not allowing 
coverage in this situation. In othqr words, there is a 
business interest argument here. That is, Plaintiff, or 
the Defendant insured has not paid a premium for the risk; 
therefore should not be covered for that risk. 
The case law in this area is very clear that there 
is no such connection. And in fact, in Elledge versus 
Warren, 2 63 South 2d 912, the Court there said, "An 
insurance company may not create irrational and illusory 
'business interest' and interpose them as a bar to 
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comprehensive coverage required by uninsured motorist 
statute." 
Later, the Court notes the rate is simply not 
related to the risk. The statute as worded is clearly 
aimed at covering a person, and not the vehicle covered by 
that policy. Therefore, the uninsured motorist coverage 
would apply whether or not the insured was walking, riding 
on a bicycle, riding on a skateboard, or traveling by a 
pogo stick. It's a very broad, almost accident policy 
rather than simply limited to risk. 
We also bring up a Federal District Court case, 
Scow versus Farmers Exchange, that was a Utah District 
Court decision interpreted by Utah law. There is no stare 
decisis affecting that holding. But at the same time, 
there is some weight to it. As noted in our later 
memoranda, even if the exclusion is upheld, we believe the 
exclusion is not applicable under these particular facts. 
The exclusion is aimed at uninsured automobiles. 
No where in the policy is owned automobiles defined to 
include motorcycles. And in fact in the PIP section of the 
policy, it indicates motorcycles are specifically exempted 
from the "motor vehicle". 
We feel A, the policy is very clear in not 
including motorcycles in this exclusion. And if the Court 
is not so aggrieved by the policy, at least the policy is 
ambiguous, and should be construed in favor of the insured. 
Looking at setoff, very similar arguments apply. 
Setoff limitations is simply a limitation not called for 
under the policy. The Court in Fhambert versus 
Continental, 621 Pacific 2d 702, Utah 1980, uses similar 
rationale to that of Scow in finding there is no exclusion 
for setoff in the statute. Therefore, the exclusion is not 
applicable. 
Finally, Your Honor, as to the issue of 
arbitration, we earlier discussed the case of Barnhart. 
Further research has unfortunately ^ed us to find Lindon 
City versus Engineer Construction Company, 63 6 Pacific 2d 
1070, a Utah case, 1981. A brief reading of that case 
makes us believe the Court has probably overruled Barnhart. 
And we would withdraw our objection to the arbitration at 
this time. 
THE COURT: It has. 
MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. DUFFIN: Can we all agree that the Supreme 
Court has not ruled on this particular question that we now 
have before the Court today? Probably they will get an 
opportunity to rule on it in reference to it, and so that 
being the case, I think it is important in reference to the 
issue. Now, I think the issue we hfrve here based upon the 
facts, and I've read them into the record, and it's in the 
deposition, first of all this man had seven motorcycles. 
He had one 1950 Ford LTD which he paid about a $70 premium. 
He had seven motorcycles he had available. 
He said some of them weren't being used on the 
road, but some of them were. He did have seven motorcycles 
available with one insured vehicle. He said in his 
deposition he did not tell his agent anything about that. 
The question was asked him on the insurance of 
motorcycles. I asked him, why didn't you ever tell your 
agent you were the owner of motorcycles? Did you ever ask 
to have these insured? He said, "No. I had no thoughts 
towards insuring the motorcycles. My entire thinking was 
it was not required by law. Therefore, I elected to go 
with the risk of driving them. 
So what he did was he deliberately assumed the 
risk of seven motorcycles. And he said that they weren't 
required to be insured. I knew automobiles were; 
motorcycles were not. Therefore, I elected to assume—he 
said in his own words, "I decided that I would assume the 
risk. And he did until he went to a law office and they 
decided that rather than proceed against the tort feasor in 
this case, they would proceed against the insured's 
insurance company. 
So we have the situation with seven motorcycles 
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deliberately knowing that they weren't insured, 
deliberately not procuring insurance. I think, and I'll 
bring the issue very quickly, I think the issue is stated 
in the ALR citation* I will agree with opposing counsel 
there is a split of authority. But as the ALR citation, 
the issue is as follows: Does public policy—that's what 
every one of them come down to—the policy is clear that we 
do not insure any vehicle owned by insureds furnished for 
his regular use for which premium is paid. And the ALR 
citation which you're going to be called on to decide is 
simply as follows: Does public policy require insurance 
protection for uninsured vehicle—in this case for seven 
additional vehicles—owned by the insured which are not 
listed on his policy for which he paid no premium? That's 
the issue. Does the uninsured motorist protection require 
an insurance company to furnish uninsured motorist 
protection for one to seven vehicles not listed on his 
policy for which he paid no premium? That's what the ALR 
citation said. 
The landmark case, which they issued in that case 
there was from Maine. Arizona has gone along with the same 
thinking. There has been as many go along. And then I'll 
go see what our Court has said, and then this Court can 
then make the decision. The Maine ALR citation which is 
the landmark for that, as it said irt Maine, because Bracket 
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was insured while riding an uninsured motorcycle owned by 
him, Section 2902 does not compel Middlesex to extend 
coverage for his injuries. 
We recently states that uninsured motorist 
coverage owned by an insured does not extend the benefits 
of such coverage for no premium to all other vehicles owned 
by the insured. Theoretically, a man could be a car 
collector, and he could have 25 automobiles that he was 
providing for regular use for his family, provide one 
policy, and pick up uninsured motorist on 25 vehicles. 
The question of the Supreme Court's we'll have to 
review eventually, and probably in this case. In this case 
we had seven. We could have 25. 
Now, let's go through and find out what our 
Supreme Court in about two sentences has said. The Call 
case, the first one that came up, and I don't dispute it, 
and I'm not going to talk about the subtraction from the 
policy, I'm not going to raise the question of the 
deduction from the policy for PIP benefits paid, he's 
probably got the better end of the argument on that. I 
think he has. But the question of whether there is 
coverage or not is addressed to us in Farmers Exchange 
versus Call, which came down December of last year. And in 
that case, they upheld, and said that was just entirely 
commensurate with, in conformance with, and in agreement 
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with the guest statute. When they abolished the guest 
statute, the household agreement was obviously invalid. 
Justice Durham said the purpose of t^ he uninsured motorist 
protection is this legislative action reflects a public 
policy requiring minimum coverage to protect innocent 
victims of automobile accidents. 
The question is, our Supreme Court has said the 
uninsured motorist protection is to protect innocent 
victims of automobile accidents. Is a person who 
deliberately decides that he's not cooing to buy any 
insurance on seven motorcycles—is he an innocent victim to 
collect on injuries for which he did not pay any premium? 
The public policy I think is clear. I think that 
it is not to protect a person—now, there may be a question 
on pit benefits, because under PIP benefits, hospitals and 
other people are, but in this case, it allows this person 
to collect insurance as though the cither party was insured. 
And in this case, he therefore wants insurance on a vehicle 
for which he paid no premium. 
If it appeals to anyone's $ense of justice, by all 
means let him adopt it. It doesn't appeal to mine. I 
think the landmark case here, which is the Osuala case was 
where the person had no insurance. I don't see any 
difference in this case. I don't ki)ow whether I'm 
pronouncing it correctly—probably turn out to be the 
11 
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1 Court's case some time ago. 
2 THE COURT: No. It wasn't mine. 
3
 I MR. DUFFIN: No. I don't think it was the Court's 
case. But in the Osuala case, the person in the very same 
5 J case as this doesn't buy any insurance. And when he got 
6 through, he said I'm an innocent victim. I should be able 
7 to collect on the other guy's insurance, because the person 
8 I ran into, the person that caused the accident had 
9 insurance. So I ought to be able to collect on his PIP 
10 coverage. 
11 And the Supreme Court said this in the Osuala 
12 case, and I think between the Call case on the purpose, and 
13 the Osuala reasoning is the thinking which our Supreme 
14 Court has given the guidelines, and the guidelines which I 
15 think this Court should follow. And they say in the Osuala 
16 case, which I've given to the Court on page 243, in regard 
17 to the Plaintiff's urgency that the no fault—let's 
18 substitute uninsured motorist here—in regard to the 
19 Plaintiff's urgence that the no fault law is intended to 
20 provide coverage for others who might be injured as a 
21 result of an automobile accident, it is pertinent to 
22 observe that he himself has not met that requirement, 
23 because he was driving without insurance. An important 
24 aspect of the act is the requirement that the PIP 
25 protections for an injured motorist are to be paid by his 
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own insurer. To permit the Plaintiff to violate the act, 
and nevertheless insist upon compensation from the other 
motorist's insurer, regardless of fault, would reward him 
for his wrong, and would tend to defeat the purposes of the 
act. 
Isn't that where we really are in this case? 
Wouldn't it be the very purpose to defeat the act to allow 
a person again to, who knows about it, who doesn't intend 
to do it, who freely admits in his deposition, I did it 
intentionally, I just assumed the risk, to come into Court 
with seven motorcycles, and say I don't buy it on that, I 
get insurance on every one of those seven vehicles, and 
it's all free, and the company ought to pay for it. 
Anyone—if it appeals by anyone's sense of justice, by all 
means adopt it. I don't believe under this circumstance—I 
don't believe the Supreme Court will uphold this .situation. 
And I think it's proper, and apparently they are also 
willing to stipulate on the question of arbitration. 
So I think we've got a single issue here that can 
very well be ruled on by the Supreme Court. And I think 
they will follow the reasoning of the Call case, and the 
Osuala case when they say it's for the protection .of 
innocent people. 
He is not that. And I thijqk that under those 
circumstances, I think he should not be given the benefit 
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of that protection. I submit it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Duffin, do you agree that there 
are no questions of fact, and this matter should be decided 
as a matter of law at this time? 
MR. DUFFIN: I agree. 
THE COURT: Mr. Sullivan? 
MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, Your Honor. May I make one 
quick comment? 
THE COURT: Let me ask you the same question, as 
long as we're here on that. I detected some dispute in the 
memorandum regarding whether or not the statements of fact 
were in fact accurate. Is there a dispute of fact here? 
MR. SULLIVAN: Your Honor, there was a civil 
dispute as to the term insurance in the deposition as used 
by Plaintiff in the memorandum. It set forth a certain 
part of the transcript. And then from that excerpt, an 
attempt to indicate that my client had no intention of 
having insurance coverage, and I brought that up in my 
latest memorandum simply to indicate that we are really 
talking about uninsured coverage here, not the vague term 
insurance. 
THE COURT: It appeared to me that the exchange 
between Counsel for the Plaintiff, Mr. Duffin, and the 
claimed insured here, the Defendant Mr. Wright, deals with 
insurance generally. Do you agree with that? 
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1 MR. DUFFIN: Dealt with what? 
2 THE COURTS Insurance generally. 
3 MR* DUFFIN: In other words k insurance coverage on 
4 this motorcycle? That's right, I s^id, Why didn't you 
5 purchase insurance on this motorcycle? I just assumed the 
6 risk. 
7 THE COURT: Mr. Sullivan is correct; you weren't 
8 talking about uninsured motorist coverage, you were talking 
9 J about insurance coverage. To the extent there is a 
difference, you acknowledge that? 
MR. DUFFIN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Is that the onl^ issue you took up? 
MR. SULLIVAN: That is the only issue. 
!4 I THE COURT: Otherwise, I assume with that 
15 J modification you would agree at this point in time there 
are no questions of fact? 
MR. SULLIVAN: I agree. The only point I would 
18 | raise is Mr. Duffin's astute use of policy for defeating 
the uninsured motorist in this situation. As the Court 
noted in the Lindon City case in overturning Bamhart, the 
Court noted that public policy is th^t set forth by the 
22 | legislature. 
If the legislature intended that public policy 
should mean not to include motorcycles within the uninsured 














that. Looking at the liability portion of the Utah statute 
on auto coverage, the legislature has in fact specified 
exclusions or limitations to that minimum coverage. 
Again, obviously the legislature has the ability 
to add those exclusions, have done so in the past. They 
did not do so here. Their clear intent is to provide broad 
coverage. 
Looking at the Osuala case, again if I pronounce 
that incorrectly, I'm sorry, there the claimant was not 
depending on any statutory basis. The claimant was simply 
looking to the no fault, and readily admitting the claimant 
had no insurance, but was intending to hook onto the 
Plaintiff's insurance simply through the basis of logic, 
and not through any statutory requirement. With that, I 
would submit it. 
THE COURT: Mr. Duffin, anything further? 
MR. DUFFIN: I could just say one thing. I think 
we have the same thing—maybe I'm trying to simplify it too 
much, but I buy one vehicle, I have six other vehicles with 
one policy, I can't see how the Supreme Court is going to 
rule that the person gets coverage on those other six 
vehicles he owns, which are for his use. That has never 
been the law. That has never been part of the insurance 
coverage. 
This concept of where we are now, and if a man 
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buys insurance, the statute says the insured automobile, 
and any other automobiles not owned fry him, not furnished 
for his regular use. But if a man can buy one insurance 
policy for $70, like he did in this case on an old klunker, 
and have Cadillacs, and 15 other cars for his use, and get 
PIT benefits on uninsured motorist, to me we're gone. 
There is no hope. And he's not an innocent victim when he 
does that. 
Now, I can even see payment on PIT benefits, 
because some ofthe companies are paying the PIT benefits, 
just period, if there is a question. But certainly the man 
is not—who is attempting to recover under uninsured 
motorist shouldn't be able to do that for his own 
liability, because he's not an innocfent victim at that 
time. A third person might, but he's not. I submit it. 
THE COURT: I don't know as I'd go so far to say 
there is no hope. I don't think Western Civilization turns 
on this decision here today. But it is a very interesting 
issue, gentlemen. I read the cases that you submitted with 
some interest. I think I'm prepared to rule on the issue 
today. I particularly read with some interest the Coates 
case, and see if I can glean any direction from that that 
might apply to uninsured motorist coverage. And the more I 
read it, the more I became convinced that I could not. The 
record is such that if the Coates case just says you get no 
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fault benefits regardless of what automobiles, or what 
vehicles you tell the insurance company you've got then 
they apply to no fault, and I can understand the reasoning 
behind it. But I don't think it follows that the same is 
true with uninsured motorist coverage that can be excluded 
under our law. And while it automatically attaches unless 
someone suggests they don't want it, that doesn't mean— 
that's different than no fault. 
So I don't think Coates is applicable, and 
certainly not dispositive of this case. 
I think it's clear if you want uninsured motorist 
coverage, you better buy it. You better pay the premium. 
I guess what it boils down to in the case that's indicated 
as the head case in the ALR annotation convinced me most of 
its soundness. So the motion for summary judgment on that 
issue sought by Bear River Mutual Company is granted, and 
the motion of Mr. Wright as a defendant is denied. And 
that makes the question of setoff and arbitration moot 
anyway. Put it in that format, and let the Supreme Court 
take a look at it. Mr. Duffin, will you prepare an order 
reflecting the Court's decision on summary judgment? And 
I'll return your copy of the deposition. I have the 
original in the file. 
(The hearing is concluded at 
this time.) 
* * * 
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After reading all of the statutes above in pend a convicted juvenile's license dp to one 
pari materia {Brown v. Keill 224 Kan, 195, year and we hold that the district court's 
Syl. 14, 580 P«2d 867 [1978]), it is our opin- order of suspension was within its Statutory 
ion that the only traffic offenses which are jurisdiction. 
not subject to the provisions of K.S.A.1979 Affirmed. 
Supp. 8-2117 are those specifically excepted 
under K.SA.1979 Supp. 38-802(e). 
[1] The fundamental rule of statutory 
construction is that the purpose and intent 
of the legislature governs when that intent 
can be ascertained from the statute. Wach-
holz v. Wachholz, 4 Kan.App.2d 161, 162, 
603 P.2d 647 (1979). The legislature obvi-
ously intended for the great majority of 
traffic offenses committed by older juve-
niles to be dealt with expeditiously and 
fairly without involving the juvenile courts. 
The justification for such a statutory 
scheme is apparent Most traffic offenses 
involve a relatively minor degree of crimi-
nal culpability and are generally susceptible 
to a prompt and reasonably accurate dispo-
sition. The offenses specifically excepted 
from the statutory scheme, i. e., K.S-A. 8 -
262 (driving without a valid driver's 
license), KJS.A. 8-287 (driving while con-
sidered a habitual violator), K.SA. 8-1566 
(reckless driving), K.S.A. 8-1568 (fleeing or 
attempting to elude police officer), K.S.A. 
21-3405 (vehicular homicide), and K.SA. 
1979 Supp. 8-1567 (driving while intoxicat-
ed), are generally more serious crimes. In 
the case of such a serious offense, the legis-
lature intended that the full panoply of 
rights and procedures normally instituted in 
juvenile matters be afforded the accused 
minor. 
[2] In the instant case defendant was 
convicted of driving left of center (K.S.A. 
8-1514). Such offense is obviously a "stat-
ute relating to the regulation of traffic on 
the roads, highways or streets" and is not 
specifically excepted under K.S.A.1979 
Supp. 38-802(e). The district court was 
thus granted jurisdiction of the matter pur-
suant to K.S.A.1979 Supp. 38-815 and K.S. 
A.1979 Supp. 8-2117. The latter statute 
expressly allows the district court to sus-
5 Kan.App.2d 98 
Pat BARNETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
Peggy CROSBY, Defendant, 
and 
~ AID Insurance Company, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 50721. 
Court of Appeals of Kansas. 
June 27, 1980. 
Review Denied Sept. ,^ 1980. 
Insured brought action igainst his in-
surer and against uninsured motorist to re-
cover for injuries sustained when car driven 
by uninsured motorist struck motorcycle in-
sured was riding. The Ford District Court, 
Robert M. Baker, J., granted summary 
judgment and dismissed insurer as a de-
fendant and returned judgment against un-
insured motorist, and injured appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Paries, J., held that: 
(1) uninsured motorist provision of policy 
covering insured's automobile excluding in-
juries arising as a result of occupying a 
vehicle other than the insured vehicle which 
was owned by insured wis an attempt to 
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consequently was void, and fact that in-
sured rejected extension of uninsured mo-
torist coverage on his motorcycle policy 
with insurer did not change insurer's liabili-
ty, and (2) insurer was not bound by dam-
ages awarded in judgment against unin-
sured motorist 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Insurance *»467.51(2) 
Any provisions of insurance policy 
which purport to condition, limit or dilute 
unqualified uninsured motorist coverage 
mandated by statute are void and unen-
forceable. K.SJL 40-284. 
2. Insurance <*=>467.51(3) 
Uninsured motorist coverage protects 
named insured wherever he may be, wheth-
er in described vehicle, another "owned" 
vehicle, a nonowned vehicle or on foot 
K.S.A. 40-284. 
3. Insurance *»467.51(3) 
Uninsured motorist provision of policy 
covering insured's automobile which exclud-
ed injuries arising as a result of occupying a 
vehicle other than the insured automobile 
owned by insured was an attempt to dilute 
coverage mandated by statute and conse-
quently was void and fact that insured re-
jected extension of uninsured motorist cov-
erage in his motorcycle policy with insurer 
did not change liability of insurer under 
such provision. K.S.A. 40-284. 
4. Judgment *»704 
Uninsured motorist insurer, which was 
granted summary judgment in insurer's 
personal injury action against it and code-
fendant, an uninsured motorist, was not 
bound by damages awarded in judgment 
rendered against codefendant 
5. Judgment *=>668(1), 678(1) 
With respect to persons in whose favor 
or against whom doctrine of res judicata is 
applicable, a former adjudication is binding 
only on parties in proceedings in which it is 
rendered and their privies. 
Syllabus by the Court 
1. Insurance provisions which purport 
to condition, limit or dilute the unqualified 
uninsured motorist coverage mandated by 
the statute are void and unenforceable. 
2. Uninsured motorist coverage pro-
tects the named insured wherever he may 
be, whether in the described vehicle, anoth-
er "owned" vehicle, a non-owned vehicle or 
on foot 
8. A provision excluding uninsured 
motorist coverage for injuries arising as a 
result of occupying a vehicle (other than the 
insured vehicle) which is owned by the 
named insured is a void attempt to dilute 
the coverage mandated by statute. 
4. When summary judgment was er-
roneously granted to a defendant insurance 
company, the company will not be bound on 
remand of the case by the judgment ren-
dered against its codefendant 
Donald E. Shultz, of Shultz, Shultz & 
Tedford, P. A., Dodge City, for plaintiff-ap-
pellant 
B. G. Larson, of Williams, Larson, Voss 
Strobel & Estes, Dodge City, for defendant-
appellee AID Ins. Co. 
Before SPENCER, P. J., and ABBOTT 
and PARKS, JJ. 
PARKS, Judge: 
This is an appeal by the plaintiff Pat 
Barnett from an order granting summary 
judgment to the defendant AID Insurance 
Company on an uninsured motorist claim. 
The facts are not in dispute. On March 
7, 1977, plaintiff was injured when a car 
driven by defendant Peggy Crosby struck 
the motorcycle Barnett was riding. Nei-
ther Crosby nor her car were insured. Bar-
nett's motorcycle and his family car were 
both insured—the car by AID and the mo-
torcycle by Midwest Mutual Insurance 
Company—but only the policy carried by 
1252 Kan. 612 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
AID on the car included uninsured motorist 
coverage. 
Barnett brought suit against both Crosby 
and AID, seeking judgment in excess of 
$10,000, AID moved for summary judg-
ment claiming that it had no duty to defend 
or to pay any judgment because: (1) its 
policy only provided liability coverage for 
Barnett's car, and (2) the uninsured motor-
ist coverage excluded injuries arising as a 
result of occupying a vehicle (other than the 
insured vehicle) which is owned by the 
named insured. The trial court upheld the 
policy exclusion, granted summary judg-
ment and dismissed AID as a defendant 
The court then discharged the jury, re-
ceived plaintiffs offer of proof and stipula-
tion, and returned a judgment against Cros-
by for the amount of damages agreed to by 
Barnett and Crosby. Plaintiff now appeals 
the trial court's ruling upholding the validi-
ty and application of the uninsured motorist 
coverage exclusion. 
[1] The offer of uninsured motorist cov-
erage to policyholders is mandatory under 
K.S.A. 40-284. Furthermore, any provi-
sions of the insurance policy which purport 
to condition, limit-or dilute the unqualified 
uninsured motorist coverage mandated by 
the statute are void and unenforceable. 
Van Hoozer v. Farmers Insurance Ex-
change, 219 Kan. 595, 607, 549 P.2d 1354 
(1976); Clayton v. Alliance Mutual Casualty 
Co., 212 Kan. 640, Syl. 11, 512 P.2d 507 
(1973). 
[2,3] The exclusion relied on by AID 
has been considered previously. Forrester 
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 
213 Kan. 442, 517 ?2i 173 (1973); Midwest 
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Co., 3 Kan. 
App^d 630, 599 P.2d 1021 (1979), rev. de-
nied 227 Kan. (March 14, 1980). In 
Midwest Mutual it was held: 
"Uninsured motorist coverage protects 
the named insured wherever he may be, 
whether in the described vehicle, another 
'owned' vehicle, a non-owned vehicle, or 
on foot" Midwest Mutual, Syl. H 3, 599 
P.2dl022. 
Therefore, since the mandatory uninsured 
motorist statute (K.S.A. 40-284) requires 
protection of the insured wherever he may 
be (Midwest Mutual), it is apparent that 
the AID exclusion clause is an attempt to 
dilute this mandated coverage and conse-
quently is void. 
The fact that Barnett rejected the exten-
sion of uninsured motorist coverage in his 
motorcycle policy with Midwest Mutual In-
surance Company does not change the lia-
bility of AID under its uninsured motorist 
provision. Barnett paid an additional pre-
mium to insure himself against the eventu-
ality of colliding with an uninsured motorist 
and should receive the benefits for which he 
paid. While it is true that Barnett could 
have stacked coverage to avoid sustaining 
damages in excess of the limits of a single 
policy (Van Hoozer v. Farmer^ Insurance 
Exchange, 219 Kan. at 608, 549| P.2d 1354), 
he chose, as was his right, to avail himself 
of the protection he had purchased from 
AID_ 
In view of the Midwest Mutual decision, 
we conclude that the trial court erred in 
granting summary judgment in favor of 
AID. Accordingly, this case must be re-
versed. 
[4] The final issue relates to whether 
AID is bound by the damages awarded in 
the judgment against its co-defendant, Peg-
gy Crosby. We hold that AID is not bound 
by that judgment. 
[5] The summary judgment granted 
AID had the effect of releasing it from any 
further responsibility to defend the lawsuit. 
The fact that AID's counsel remained in the 
courtroom does not mean that AID was or 
could have been involved in the subsequent 
proceedings against Crosby. (?nce summa-
ry judgment was granted, All) was neither 
a privy nor a party to the judgment against 
Crosby. With respect to persdns in whose 
favor or against whom the doctrine of res 
judicata is applicable, a former adjudication 
is binding only on parties in the proceedings 
in which it is rendered and their privies. 
Adamson v. J 
536 (1969). 
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Adamson v. Hill, 202 Kan. 482,488,449 P.2d 
536 (1969). 
The conclusion that AID should not be 
bound by the prior determination of liabili-
ty is also supported by Clayton, 212 Kan. at 
652, 512 PJ2d 507. There the principal de-
fendant defaulted while the insurance com-
pany, Alliance, sought time to prepare legal 
argument concerning its contractual liabili-
ty. The trial court excused Alliance from 
the default hearing and stated that the 
ruling on liability was limited to the co-de-
fendant, Bedore. The trial court entered 
judgment against Bedore and held that Al-
liance was bound by the previous determi-
nation of damages. The Supreme Court 
reversed and held that Alliance was not 
collaterally estopped from challenging the 
damage judgment. The reason for not im-
posing collateral estoppel in this case is 
even greater because AID was granted 
judgment before any determination of lia-
bility was made and would have no cause to 
defend the suit further. 
We reverse and remand this case to the 
district court for trial on the issue of liabili-
ty of AID Insurance Company. 
KEYftUMB£RSYSTtM> 
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FENDER PIPE & SUPPLY, 
INC., Appellant, 
v. 
Don JENKINS and Ed Broyles, 
Appellees. 
No. 50898. 
Court of Appeals of Kansas. 
June 27, 1980. 
Seller of tubing and lengths of rod for 
use in oil and gas well, which was being 
drilled, brought suit to recover value of the 
supplies on theory that a lien followed such 
-merchandise. The Cowley District Court, 
Robert L Bishop, A. J., granted judgment 
for seller for value of tubing, but denied 
recovery for the lengths of rod, and seller 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Abbott, 
J., held that seller did not obtain lien, pur-
suant to oil field supply lien statute, for the 
lengths of rod where they were not actually 
used in digging, drilling, torpedoing, com-
pleting, operating or repairing of the well. 
Affirmed. 
Mines and Minerals «=» 112(3) 
Lien could not be obtained, pursuant to 
oil field supply lien statute, for lengths of 
rod sold and delivered to leasehold owner 
for use in a oil and gas well being drilled 
where such material was not actually used 
in digging, drilling, torpedoing, completing, 
operating or repairing the well. K.S.A. 55-
207. 
Syllabus by the Court 
In order to obtain a lien pursuant to 
K.S.A. 55-207 for material sold to the lease-
hold owner and delivered to the leasehold, 
the material must be actually used in the 
digging, drilling, torpedoing, completing, 
operating or repairing of any oil and gas 
well for which the material was furnished. 
Robert L. Earnest, Russell, for appellant 
No appearance by appellee. 
Before ABBOTT, P. J., 
HART and MEYER, JJ. 
and SWINE-
ABBOTT, Judge: 
This is an appeal from a judgment deny-
ing a lien under K.S.A. 55-207 for 88 
lengths of '/Wnch rod that plaintiff stipulat-
ed was delivered to the well site but not 
used. 
